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Abstract—Recently we could see several institutions coming
together to create consortium based blockchain networks such
as Hyperledger. Although for applications of blockchain such as
Bitcoin, Litcoin, etc. the majority-attack might not be a great
threat but for consortium based blockchain networks where we
could see several institutions such as public, private, government,
etc. are collaborating, the majority-attack might just prove to be a
prevalent threat if collusion among these institutions takes place.
This paper proposes a methodology where we can use intelligent
software agents to monitor the activity of stakeholders in the
blockchain networks to detect anomaly such as collusion, using
supervised machine learning algorithm and algorithmic game
theory and stop the majority-attack from taking place.
Index Terms—Computer Security, network, blockchain, ma-
chine learning, algorithmic game theory, majority attack,
anomaly detection
I. INTRODUCTION
When Satoshi Nakamoto [2] released the technology named
Bitcoin, he revolutionised the industry not because he has
invented a new currency system, which do not require in-
tervention of institutional mediator while transferring money
from one entity to another, but because he has gifted one of the
most disruptive technology, which has come to life in decades.
With the introduction of Bitcoin, Blockchain got introduced to
the world, which is a digital ledger in which all transactions
are recorded chronologically and publicly. But the application
of blockchain is not just limited to crypto-currencies [3, 4]
such as Bitcoin and have proved to be useful in tracking
ownership, provenance of documents, digital assets, physical
assets, voting rights, etc. As we can see the rise in use of
blockchain technologies, we can also see rise of security issues
such as ’Double-Spending’, especially in the Majority Attack
[2, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The majority attack is carried out by a group
of individuals/entities in the decentralised environment, who
colludes to take control over the ledger to gain profit from
it. In this proposed methodology, a novel approach of using
Algorithmic Game Theory concepts and Machine Learning
techniques is used to reduce the chances of collusion in the
* This work was supported in part by a grant from Codeepy Pvt. Ltd. with
reference CDPY/2018/1.
decentralized system to gain advantage over other miners
so that the system can be as fair as possible. In section 2,
some background theory regarding blockchain and economy
of double-spending is discussed. In section 3, the proposed
methodology is discussed. Finally the paper ends with some
discussion in section 4 and conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND THEORY AND RELATED WORK
In this section we will visit the concepts of double-spending
and the majority attack in Blockchain. Later in this section we
will also discuss the economy of the attack being performed
and how Game Theory is applicable to security implications
in blockchain as well.
A. Blockchain, Double-Spending & Majority Attack
A double-spending attack [2, 5, 6, 7] in blockchain means
the attacker has to convince the merchant that a transaction
has been confirmed and then convince the entire network to
approve some other transaction, which will lead to the attacker
keeping both the money and the service (goods) from the
merchant whereas the merchant would be left with neither
the money or the service. This problem in synchronization
is solved by proof-of-work, which is a computational effort
consisting of hashes to acknowledge the groups of transac-
tions, also known as blocks. For a transaction to be valid,
sufficient work has been done to acknowledge that the block
contains it. Since, validation of blocks require computational
effort to do so, this also gives rise to another issue, what if the
attacker has substantial computational power at its disposal?
All the attacker has to do is mine a blockchain privately till
the length of the chain becomes longer than the chain mined
by the honest network, and release this private blockchain for
confirmation when it is appropriate.
In Rosenfeld’s paper [6] the probability of the attacker
succeeding in his attack is discussed. If we consider z as the
number of blocks by which the honest network has advantage
over the attacker then z = n - m, where n is the number of
blocks in the chain on top of the one where fork started for
the honest network, whereas m is the number of blocks in the
chain on top of the fork which the attacker has built. Before we
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discuss the probability of having advantage over the attacker,
let us consider the following assumptions:
• The total hashrate of the attacker and honest network is
constant. They have a hashrate of H combined, of which
pH belongs to honest network and qH belongs to the
attacker, where p + q = 1.
• The mining difficulty is constant, such that the time taken
to find a block with H hashrate is To.
There are two possibilities of double-spending attack, which
is either the attack succeeds or it fails, as follows:
zi+1 =
{
zi + 1, with probability p.
zi − 1, with probability q.
If we consider az to be the probability of the attacker
succeeding in the attack then we can arrive at the following
equation:
az = paz+1 + qaz−1 (1)
And if we solve this using the boundary condition and the
notion p + q = 1 then we can conclude:
az = min(
q
p
, 1)max(z+1,0)
=
{
1, ifz < 0||q > p
( qp )
z+1, ifz(>)0||q(<)p
(2)
If we assume n number of blocks are found by the honest
network and m + 1 number of blocks are found by the
attacker during this time period then the probability (r) of
double-spending to succeed when the merchant waits for n
confirmations using the equation (2) is:
r =
∞∑
m=0
P (m)a(n−m−1)
=
1−
∑n
m=0(
m+ n− 1
m
)(pnqm − pmqn) ifq < p
1 ifq > p
(3)
In the study [6], it is proved that as the number of confir-
mations by the honest network increased, the success rate of
the attack decreased but no matter how many confirmations
by the honest network has succeeded, the attack will always
succeed if the hashrate of the attacker approached 50% of the
total network hashrate, which means q ≥ 0.5.
This proves that an attacker with more computing power at
its disposal might prove to be a key factor in succeeding in the
attack. This particularly raises security concerns in Consortium
Blockchain [5, 7, 8] such as Hyperledger, where we can
see involvement of several companies or business entities.
Whoever in the Hyperledger network holds the maximum
computing power, can always get a competitive advantage over
its competitors while performing business transaction over the
network.
With Proof of Work, more CPU/GPU power is required in
checking hashes of each block in the blockchain. Because of
this mechanism, more and more business entities would like
to join in this mining process, which would create ?mining
pools?, and once the mining pool holds 51% computing power,
then it would take control of the blockchain. Therefore, by
taking control what it can do is [5, 8]:
• Modify the transaction data, which can lead to double
spending attack
• To stop the block verification transaction
• To stop miners mining any available block
B. Economy of Double-Spending
In the study by Rosenfeld [6], it was found that the number
of confirmations required to keep the success rate of the
attacker (double-spending) below 10%, 1% and 0.1%, are 2,
4 and 6 respectively. In addition, we have already seen that
once the attacker’s hashrate reaches 50% of the total network
hashrate then the number of confirmations required reaches
infinity, which means no amount of confirmation can defeat
the attack. Taking this into account, we also have to consider
the likelihood of the attack being performed in reality. If value
of the commodity being exchanged is assumed to have a value
of v and the attacker has mined o number of blocks where each
block has a value of B, then if the attack succeeds the attacker
will gain v, where if the attack fails then the attacker will
loose v + oB. Therefore, if we consider the two possibilities,
the payoff (s) for the attacker is as follows:
s =
{
v, ifq => 0.5
−(v + oB), ifq < 0.5 (4)
where q is the hashrate of the attacker
And in order to carry on with the attack the value of v
has to be significant. This payoff (s) will prove to be useful
in portraying the security implication in the light of Game
Theory, and how decisions can be made to classify whether
an attack is taking place or not.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In section 2.B we have already seen that payoff (s) for the
attacker can only have two possibilities: succeed or fail. This
is where Game Theory [1] comes into account. But before we
get into the concept let us define few terminologies of Game
Theory in this context as follows:
• Self-Interested Agents: This can be any entity such as a
person, business or any other institution in the blockchain
network with their own preferences and utility. This also
includes honest entities and attacker(s).
• Player: Each Self-Interested Agent who are participating
in the blockchain network. Let us assume that there are
N players where N = (1,?.., n) is a finite set of n, indexed
by i.
• Action: Action taken by each player based on their
preferences and utility. And let us assume that set of
actions taken by the player i is Ai where Ai = (a1,?.,
an)
• Payoff : The reward, which each player receives
Now, if we consider the equation (4) then we can see the
attacker would want to maximize the probability of getting
a payoff of v instead of loosing v + oB. Therefore, we can
extend the same equation (4) to derive the utility function/
payoff function as follows:
u(a) =
{
v, ifq => 0.5
−(v + oB), ifq < 0.5 (5)
where u is utility, a is the action taken by the attacker, q is
the hashrate of the attacker, v is value of commodity/service
by the merchant, o is number of blocks mined, B is value of
each block.
This utility function (v) will govern the decision on whether
an attack is bound to happen or not by the attacker based on
the value of the commodity/service. And in order to keep the
blockchain network safe from the Majority Attack we should
focus on this function.
We can feed this utility function to Supervised Machine
Learning algorithms to classify whether an attack is likely to
take place or not. If the attack is likely to take place then
set of rules should be implemented by the system to either
prevent the blockchain confirmation from the attacker(s) or
to prevent confirmation of the whole transaction till a new
fair transaction is performed again i.e. no payoffs for anyone,
in order to ensure fairness and legitimate transactions being
confirmed in the network.
In order to achieve this, an intelligent agent is implemented
in the application layer of the blockchain network system,
which would have two distinct parts:
1) Based on the past transactions of the stakeholders the
probability of each stakeholder to defect
2) Based on the current value of the commodity/service
being sold in the current transaction the probability of
the stakeholder(s) to attack through majority attack
Fig. 1. Proof-of-Work (The Proposed Methodology)
In Fig.1, we can see the workflow of the proposed method-
ology where after the new block is released in the network
for the consensus purpose by the stakeholders (including
attacker and other players), the intelligent software agent in
the application layer of the network uses the utility function
(v) to classify the motive of the stakeholders and the value of
the current service being sold in the transaction. If the motive
of the stakeholders is deemed to be malicious in nature with
the intent of collusion to perform a majority attack then the
transaction is cancelled and all the stakeholders are requested
for a new transaction instead.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the proposed methodology we have discussed about
the utility function (v) based on the value of the service
or commodity being sold in the current transaction. Here,
the commodity does not have to be something that has a
tangible value in the network, rather it can have some personal
attachment or importance to the stakeholder(s). In that case
the intelligent agent needs to deduce the level of attachment
or importance of the commodity or service being handled in
the transaction in order to calculate the utility function and
then the probability of the majority attack from taking place.
V. CONCLUSION
As blockchain technology becomes more and more popular,
we can see emergence of several variations of such consensus
based distributed ledger systems where majority-attack can
become more proficient. In order to prevent such malicious
activity in the consensus based distributed ledger systems we
can utilise some variations of the Proof-of-Work proposed
in this paper. Although this is a work in progress and in
it?s preliminary stage, the proposed Proof-of-Work will be
extended to provide more holistic approach to such issues
faced in the system.
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